Sociological approach to the analysis of international cooperation.
Практическое занятие №14
Содержание практического занятия:
Political realism: interstate cooperation.
Currently, in the international system, cooperation as a form of interstate relations is implemented more often than conflict. However, their practical aspects have been little conceptualized in international relations, especially in the context of the fact that these forms are categories of dialectics. In this regard, in order to determine the role of inter-state cooperation in international relations, it is necessary to correlate cooperation with its paired category.
D. Shevchuk notes that “conflicts and cooperation are among the most significant characteristics of international relations, considered as a process, and are inextricably linked sides of interaction between their participants [1]. In the language of Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, they are a “dialectical pair“ - that is, mutually presupposing and mutually determining opposites that can “change places”.
In the theory of interstate cooperation and conflict, there are two directions: “liberalism” and “realism”. The development of the liberalist concept took place until the mid-30s of the last century, after this concept was replaced by the concept of realism, which operated until the 70s.
Prior to this period, the problems of cooperation were secondary to the problems of conflict. Thus, the theory of cooperation was based on the theory of conflict. In accordance with this, starting from the 50s, such a direction of the theory of inter-state relations as conflictology began to be formed, bringing the theory of inter-state conflict into an independent direction.
But the same could not be said about the theory of interstate cooperation, which for a long time remained unnoticed by researchers in the field of international relations. The main focus of research in this area was the study of military-political unions as a form of interstate cooperation.
However, since the 60s, the need to study the problems of interstate cooperation has gradually come to the fore. During this period, issues of integration processes, which were considered as a form of interstate cooperation, become relevant. Already in the 80’s, cooperation became an independent direction in the theory of international relations, as well as the direction of conflictology.
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The prerequisites for studying interstate cooperation are the need for answers to such questions as internal reasons for the formation of cooperation, obstacles to the development of cooperation in the international environment, types and forms of cooperation, and many others.
At the same time, translation as a fundamental component of collaboration becomes an important issue for researchers. As a result, a fairly large amount of material has been generated for the study of problems and models of interstate cooperation.
The classical dialectic between realistic and liberal theories of international politics, expressed by R. Keohane and R. Rosecrance, can be overcome [5]. Neither paradigm explains the only correct international behavior. While realism is the dominant approach, liberal theories of transnationalism and interdependence help illuminate how national interests are being studied and changed.
Cohen and his fellow critics argue that neorealism, formulated definitively in the“ Theory of international politics “ by K. Waltz, systematizes the concepts of realism, but focuses on the structure of the international system at the expense of systemic processes. Focused on the concept of bipolarity, Waltz’s theory tends to be consistent.
At the same time, it is important to note that realism and neorealism deny the very possibility of cooperation in interstate interaction. K. Waltz notes that “States, when planning or implementing their foreign policy, strive to maximize relative benefits, i.e., seek to acquire more opportunities than their partners.”
Classical realists also focus more on human nature. They believe that people are generally selfish and aggressive. The main actors in the international system, States, are guided by these principles, which leads to the inevitability of conflicts.
In turn, neorealists are more focused on the distribution of power in the international system. The theory is based on the claim that the international system does not have a sovereign power that could conclude and enforce binding agreements. Without such power, States are given the opportunity to do what they like, which ultimately prevents States from trusting each other and, as a result, effectively cooperating.
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This situation is further reinforced by the realistic assumption that the main goal of the state is to maximize power and security. Therefore, without a global center of power and influence that would keep States aspiring to power, it is difficult to prevent international conflicts.
2.Theory of international regimes
Regime theory is a theory within international relations derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states or other international actors. It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, as regimes are, by definition, instances of international cooperation.
While realism predicts that conflict should be the norm in international relations, regime theorists say that there is cooperation despite anarchy. Often they cite cooperation in trade, human rights, and collective security, among other issues. These instances of cooperation are regimes. The most commonly cited definition comes from Stephen Krasner, who defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations".
Not all approaches to regime theory, however are liberal or neoliberal; some realist scholars like Joseph Grieco developed hybrid theories which take a realism-based approach to this fundamentally liberal theory. (Realists do not say cooperation never happens, just that it's not the norm—a difference of degree).
As stated above, a regime is defined by Stephen D. Krasner as a set of explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations". This definition is intentionally broad, and covers human interaction ranging from formal organizations (e.g., OPEC) to informal groups (e.g., major banks during the debt crisis). Note that a regime need not be composed of states.
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Within IPE there are three main approaches to regime theory: the dominant, liberal-derived interest-based approach, the realist critique of interest-based approaches, and finally knowledge-based approaches that come from the cognitivist school of thought. The first two are rationalist approaches while the third is sociological.
Within regime theory, because regime theory is by definition a theory that explains international cooperation (i.e., it's a traditionally liberal concept) liberal approaches prevail within the literature.
Sociological approach to the analysis of international cooperation.
The study of international cooperation has emerged and evolved over the past few decades as a cornerstone of international relations research. Our strategy for reviewing such a large literature is to focus primarily on the rational choice and game theoretic approaches that instigated it and have subsequently guided its advance. Without these theoretical efforts, the study of international cooperation could not have made nearly as much progress—and it certainly would not have taken the form it does in the 21st century. Through this lens, we identify major themes in this literature and highlight key challenges for future research.
While we emphasize the contribution of theoretical approaches to the study of international cooperation, this review goes beyond the success of formal models. First, advances in the study of international cooperation have been intertwined with substantive knowledge of international politics. Indeed, a substantial and growing body of work on international cooperation does not directly depend on formal approaches, although this article argues that it has been deeply influenced by it. Second, international cooperation theory is a progressive research program that has repeatedly confronted and responded to the limits of its analysis. One of the prime virtues of formal work is that by making its assumptions clear, it helps researchers to identify its limits and thereby facilitates efforts to overcome them. Two examples developed here include the failure of early approaches to address either international institutions or domestic politics, both of which now figure prominently in cooperation theory. Third, the study of international cooperation has also sparked competitive approaches, such as constructivism and agent-based modeling, which have broadened our understanding of international cooperation and provided important challenges for the rational approach. Although these competitors are sometimes presented as antithetical to rational cooperation theory, they are often highly compatible with the rational approach; like Fearon and Wendt (2002) this article thus advocates a pragmatic approach and sees many potential synergies—and even some convergence—between the rational tradition and its competitors. Focus here is on these areas of agreement rather than on engaging in a detailed discussion of the contributions of constructivism both for reasons of space and because Hoffmann (2010) in this compendium already offers an excellent exploration of constructivist approaches. Finally, while international cooperation has always been motivated by empirical puzzles—starting with why states cooperate in anarchy—recent work has integrated theoretical and empirical analyses in a more sophisticated and deeper way. Space limitations prevent us from covering the now extensive empirical literature based around international cooperation theory except for a few select examples.
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We begin with the developmental logic of international cooperation theory (ICT), which is not a single theory but a family of closely related models. Rigorous analytical models have significantly sharpened our understanding of international politics. The second section reviews major themes in ICT. We discuss the key assumptions and logics underlying this literature as well as strategies to deal with the empirical and theoretical challenges it confronts, including the need to deal with distributional and domestic issues. The third section reviews how ICT has reinvigorated the study of international institutions both as forms of international cooperation and as constraints on how international cooperation unfolds. While ICT began with the assumption that states are the primary and unitary actors, recent work has modified this foundation by bringing nonstate actors and domestic politics into the study of international institutions. This essay concludes with an assessment of ongoing trends, needs, and possibilities for the ICT research program.
The Developmental Logic of International Cooperation Theory States have practiced international cooperation since well before Thucydides discussed diplomacy, treaties, and alliances over two thousand years ago. Yet the study of international cooperation is surprisingly young. The concept of cooperation, as we currently understand it, crystallized in the early 1980s (Taylor, 1976; Axelrod, 1981, 1984) as the coordinated behavior of independent and possibly selfish actors that benefits them all. Individual selfishness need not impede cooperation in situations of interdependence where one individual’s welfare depends on others’ behavior; cooperation requires neither altruism nor government—both of which are often in short supply at the international level.
This definition of international cooperation is general in terms of both actors and issues. Cooperation occurs not only among individuals but also among collective entities, including firms, political parties, ethnic organizations, terrorist groups, and nation-states. Although ICT often defines international cooperation in terms of states, it can also involve other actors, especially intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These diverse actors cooperate for different objectives across a wide range of issue areas: IGOs work with states to combat global environmental problems, firms collude to monopolize markets, NGOs campaign to save the whales, and so on. Finally, international cooperation is not always a good thing, at least from the perspective of those excluded or targeted. For example, international sanctions involve cooperation against target countries (Martin, 1992a; Drezner, 1999), and commodity cartels often harm consumer states.
Although the phenomenon of international cooperation is broad, the rationalist approach to international cooperation shares common analytic elements. It usually takes the actors and their objectives as given to focus on their strategic interactions. Thomas Schelling, a pioneer of the strategic approach to international cooperation, writes in the preface to the 1980 edition of his 1960 classic, The Strategy of Conflict:
“I hoped to help establish an interdisciplinary field that had then been variously described as ‘theory of bargaining,’ ‘theory of conflict,’ or ‘theory of strategy.’ The field that I hoped would become established has continued to develop, but not explosively, and without acquiring a name of its own” (Schelling, 1980, pp. v–vi).
The name of that field that Schelling envisions could well be cooperation theory. Throughout The Strategy of Conflict is the simple premise that actors with conflicting goals nevertheless share a common interest that leaves much room for strategic interaction and for cooperation. This insight led Schelling to view most situations as bargaining situations. If we think of reaching a mutually beneficial deal as cooperation, then actors’ differences over which bargain to strike raises distributional issues. The bargaining perspective leads to a host of related and extremely consequential considerations—including credible commitments, the advantageous use of a bargaining agent, issue linkages, and the effect of reputation—which have been developed more fully in the subsequent international relations literature.
ICT has taken Schelling’s key insight seriously. In After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) discusses conflict and cooperation as two sides of the same coin in international political economy. This insight is more forcefully elaborated by James Fearon’s (1995) rationalist explanation of war: because war is costly, even bitter enemies share a mutual interest in avoiding it. Thus, Fearon explains war as the failure of the parties to cooperate on a peaceful solution.
Further stimulation for ICT was provided by Charles Kindleberger’s (1973) analysis of the Great Depression, which emphasizes the need for a hegemon to solve global public goods problems. Because a pure public good benefits everyone, and no one can be excluded from it, there is no individual incentive to contribute to the good. Kindleberger built on Mancur Olson’s (1965) analysis of how privileged groups dominated by one actor can overcome the resulting collective action problem. This research spawned a large hegemonic stability theory literature examining whether international leaders work through benevolence (as implied by Kindleberger) or through coercion, which was the only cooperation then countenanced by neorealism. This was challenged by Keohane’s After Hegemony argument that institutions could maintain this cooperation even after hegemonic decline, and by Duncan Snidal’s (1985a) analysis that cooperation is possible in the absence of a dominant state. David Lake (1993) provides a further extension regarding how to think about leadership in a hegemonic world, but this literature has unfortunately itself declined despite the continuing importance of understanding U.S. dominance in the international system and a resurgent literature on global public goods (Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003).
Real world events and intellectual developments also shaped the emergence of ICT. Substantively, although the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinvigorated the Cold War, cooperation and institutionalization had become central to international politics: war among Western states seemed increasingly remote, there had been a dramatic rise of interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977), and the Bretton-Woods system had proved to be a fairly stable cooperative arrangement even through the crises of the 1970s. Intellectually, new developments in noncooperative game theory offered a powerful framework for analyzing circumstances where there is no central authority to enforce agreements. Recognizing enduring cooperative arrangements in the real world and equipped with noncooperative game theory, a group of scholars set out to dispel the pessimism of the then-dominant neorealist approach by answering the question of how international cooperation is possible under anarchy.
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